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THE
ANTHROPOLOGICAL REVIEW.

No. XV.

OCTOBER, 1866.

RACE IN RELIGION.*

THE PLACE OF POSITIVISM.

ANTHROPOLOGY is gradually widening its base and enlarging its arena. Its practice is approaching more nearly to its theory. As the science of man, nothing human is really foreign to it. Above all, no religion or philosophy can be regarded as altogether alien to its inquiries. Whether as effects or causes, the beliefs and opinions of mankind are worthy of all attention by the anthropological student. Here we may behold the accumulated results of the past, and, in a measure, the plastic forces of the present. Religions and philosophies are not accidents, but the normal product, the necessary consequence, of antecedent conditions. They were not made by art, but have grown in obedience to law. They come and they depart at their appointed season. They have their cycle of growth, splendour, and decay, like those great political empires, which constitute the more prominent features of history. In truth, they are empires of the mind, built up by the labours and sacrifices of many successive generations, and beneath whose shadow, in the day of their power, the mightiest are fain to seek refuge. And we live in an age, it may be remarked, peculiarly

* *A General View of Positivism.* Translated from the French of Auguste Comte, by J. H. Bridges. London: Trübner and Co.

The Catechism of Positive Religion. Translated from the French of Auguste Comte, by Richard Congreve. London: John Chapman.

The New Religion in its Attitude towards the Old; The Propagation of the Religion of Humanity. By Richard Congreve. London: John Chapman.

Auguste Comte and Positivism. By John Stuart Mill. London: Trübner and Co.

The Unity of Comte's Life and Doctrine. By J. H. Bridges. London: Trübner and Co.

favourable to an investigation of the laws which regulate their production and dissolution—an age of analysis and disintegration, when authority is dethroned and power is held in abeyance, and when, consequently, there is not only liberty to think, but also license to speak. In the middle ages, it would not have been possible to thoroughly criticise either the Catholic Church or the Aristotelian philosophy. But it is otherwise now, when the old Phœnix is in the fire, and the world re-echoes with her harmonious death-song; and we are at liberty to question everything, faith and philosophy not excepted.

There can be no doubt that forms of thought and modes of feeling are largely racial; that is, they originate in the specialities of mental constitution attaching to the different divisions of mankind. And an important part of our duty as anthropologists, is to study these specialities and trace their effects, as manifested in the creeds, codes, philosophy, literature, and art of various nations and successive ages. Their creed is the grandest outcome of a people. In it their deepest convictions and highest aspirations were once embodied. And if they be so no longer, if there be a school of thought outside of the church, higher and purer, larger and nobler in its teachings than anything within it, then is such a church infallibly doomed, however long its sentence may be delayed. Olympus was condemned in the very words with which Socrates taught his disciples; while Jupiter stood as a criminal at the bar over which Plato presided as a judge.

The interaction between faith and philosophy is much greater than is usually supposed. The *à priori* schoolmen flourished in conjunction with the Catholic church. Protestantism and the reign of induction came in together; the former being an appeal from authority to reason, in matters theological; and the latter being a similar appeal to facts, in the domain of science. In both departments there was the same descent from unity to multiplicity, from one church to many sects, and from a few principles to an indefinite number of "instances". In the largest view of the subject, it may perhaps be said that philosophy is the sphere of growth, religion of conservation; the intuitions of genius being ultimately sanctified as articles of faith.

To fully understand our present position, in reference either to faith or philosophy, it must be remembered that we live, not at the beginning or even in the middle, but obviously towards the end of a disintegrative era. What the ages of faith laboriously built up, the ages of doubt have assiduously pulled down. But the one process is as essentially temporary as the other. True analysis is ever but a preparation for synthesis; destruction is only transformation, the gate of death being simply a portal to the temple of life. Of neces-

sity, then, an age of re-edification awaits us; and that, too, in all probability, at an era not immeasurably remote. Already, indeed, the signs of its approaching advent are distinctly visible. The age of revolution and anarchy is drawing to a close. Men are becoming weary of commotion, and ask everywhere for a strong government, adequate to the suppression of aimless insurrection. While even the churches, forgetting their old *odium theologicum*, seem desirous to coalesce, as if conscious that it is becoming necessary to close up their disordered ranks, and present a united front to the common enemy.

Of this movement towards re-edification, Positivism, whether as a religion or a philosophy, was both a sign and a product. We may define it as a rather premature, though really grand and gigantic, attempt at the synthesis of universal knowledge; while Auguste Comte was a still more premature, and so utterly unsuccessful attempt at the performance of "the coming man". Both portents, however, of no mean significance; shadows whose substances are doubtless somewhere behind. Of Positivism in its relation to science, we do not here intend to speak at any length. Whatever may be thought of its "systematisation", we suppose all competent judges are of opinion that the sooner the positive mode of explaining phenomena supersedes the theological and metaphysical, the better. Here, then, Comte did real and appreciable work. But unfortunately, like many other great men, he lived rather too long. He outgrew his true vocation, and set himself up, not only as the hierophant, but also as the prophet and law-giver of a universal faith. This is a rather melancholy subject; but it concerns us, as anthropologists, more nearly than any other portion of his life and labours. It, moreover, involves ideas that are not peculiar to M. Comte, which he inherited from antecedent or adopted from coexistent systems, and which, therefore, have an interest for us quite independently of their relationship to Positivism.

The Positive religion commences with a dreadful solecism—it has no God! a circumference without a centre. What a beautiful illustration of race. Here is a French master mind turned prophet, and cannot find a God to worship; and so sets up select humanity, the *Grand Être*, in his place! Nor is this all; for in his ritual he ordains that prayers shall be said, not to humanity as the male, or as the male and female in combination, but specially to woman, as the mother, wife, and daughter, the incarnate past, present, and future of the race! Now, supposing that in place of an Indo-European Gaul, with his strong Pantheistic proclivities,—for the Positive religion is simply a phase of Pantheism,—a faith had been founded in our day, by a seer of purely Semitic type and descent, does any an-

thropologist doubt that a God would have been at the centre of it? And does anyone suppose that, in such a case, women or a woman would have been made an object of worship in it? And this godless, feminine faith, was expected by its polite expounder to prevail, not only over Aryanised Europe—moderately well prepared for it, we must admit, by the worship of the Virgin and the invocation of Saints—but it was also expected to satisfy the godward aspirations and sublime yearnings of the monotheistic Semites of Western Asia!

No doubt a new faith is coming, and that, too, over an unequalled geographical area. The vast amount of thought and knowledge, the accumulated product of modern civilisation, lying on the outside of our existing creed, indicates a growing necessity for the expansion of religious belief. We want a faith that will harmonise with the literature and science of modern times. We want a religion abreast with the age, and looking prophetically forward to the future, rather than retrospectively back into the past. We require a belief in harmony with our intellectual development, the product not simply of defunct wisdom, but also of living conviction. And this faith, once originated and established among the leading nations of the world, must have a geographical range previously unexampled. The railway and the steamboat utterly forbid the perpetuation of existing territorial limitations in language and creed. The interaction of nations and races increases every day, and must ultimately sweep down many of the barriers that formerly kept even allied peoples in a state of isolation from each other. But then, one of the conditions on which this faith can be accepted over the ever expanding area of modern civilisation, and so effect the gradual, if not rapid, displacement of existing creeds is, that it shall in no department fall short of the highest tidemark of any of its predecessors. It must have no Polytheism, or Tritheism, or Pantheism, or Atheism to disgust its Semitic votaries; while it must be expansive, receptive, æsthetic, and philosophic enough to satisfy the most intellectual requirements of its Indo-European converts. And it must be all this to prove even a Caucasian faith, to enlist the sympathies of humanity, from the Ganges to the Thames. But even granting it were all this, does any anthropologist suppose it could prevail over so large an area and among so many different types, without extensive local adaptations and modifications, more especially in its ritual, to accommodate it to the wants and habitudes, the taste and feelings, of its racially varied converts? And what shall we say, in such a consideration, to the Mongolic nations of Eastern Asia, the great upholders of existing Buddhism, or the African Negroes with their grovelling Fetish worship; or, we may add, the outstanding savages of any continent?

But, quite independently of racial considerations, the religious system of Auguste Comte clearly demonstrates that, whatever else he may have studied, he most assuredly had not mastered the laws which regulate the generation and succession of creeds. He did not build on the old foundations. A fatal error. Why, there is no example on record of a faith emerging into great and enduring power, except as the lineal successor of some predecessor. Judaism built on the patriarchal theology, and Christianity rests on Judaic foundations, while the faith of Islam accepts and professes to supplement all three. Jupiter was not supposed to deny the divinity of Saturn; he only superseded him. This subject of *growth* in the progress of society is, it would seem, but very imperfectly understood; and hence the many absurd and abortive attempts at reconstruction, whether in the religious, political, or social sphere, of which these latter generations have been the witness. And yet the experience of all time demonstrates that religion and politics cannot be fundamentally and yet suddenly remodelled. Society, whether as a whole or in any of its more important departments, is much too complex, and depends on too many varied forces for its movement, to permit of its being taken to pieces and put together again, at the pleasure of any merely human designer. It is, in truth, a vast moral organism, at a certain stage of development; and can no more be made or remade than a tree or an animal. It grows as we have said, and it may be added, after the true organic fashion, by a constant assimilation of appropriate elements from without; and consequently all that any individual can hope to accomplish, is but to contribute his quota of thought or effort to the sum total of results. But few ardent reformers are prepared to submit to this. They have not, it is to be feared, sufficient faith in the laws of nature, for this wise yet lowly dependance upon their efficient operation. They cannot quietly let things take their course. They are too impatient to wait for results; they want to force them. They place too much confidence in art—their own art—wherewith they foolishly hope to supersede the grander processes, and forestall the slower results of nature.

These remarks do not apply especially to Auguste Comte. They are yet more applicable to St. Simon, Fourier, Owen, and the leaders of socialism and communism generally. Neither did Comte fall into the most grievous of all errors, which is the endeavour to refound society without religion. He clearly saw that a creed and a ritual are necessities; and he simply failed in providing such as would satisfy the higher requirements of humanity. The real interest of Positivism, however, to an anthropologist, is not its relation to Auguste Comte as an individual, but to the age in which he lived, and of

whose tendencies he regarded himself as a befitting exponent. To fully understand the place of Positivism, to know its vocation in the world, nay to clearly perceive that it had a recognisable place and vocation at all, we must comprehend the real character and grander inspiration of the age in which it appeared, and this implies a historical survey of considerable extent.

Nothing is more clear than the continuity of the current of civilisation; it has had its ebbs and its flows, its high tide and its low tide, but it has remained throughout an unbroken stream. At this hour, not only the mechanical arts, but the literature, philosophy and religion of the most advanced nations, are indebted to elements, inherited from Etruscan, Egyptian, Assyrian and Hindoo systems of culture that meet us at the dawn of authentic history. The rise and fall of empires, the growth and decay of faiths, are not to be viewed in the light of exceptional catastrophes. There is nothing abnormal in such events; they are, on the contrary, the normal phenomena necessarily attendant on the process of progression.

History has obviously lost some of its earlier chapters. Not to mention the Etruscan and Cyclopean civilisation of Europe, it is obvious that a mighty drama was transacted in the East, of which we have but very imperfect records. The great Aryan emigration, that carried a European race to the Ganges, or bore an Asian race to the Thames, as we may be pleased to interpret the yet doubtful oracles of philology and tradition, what do we really know of it, except the fact of its occurrence, demonstrated by the lingual and racial effects which it has left for our investigation? And that great and almost prehistoric cycle of Semitic civilisation, whereof Egyptian, Phœnician, Assyrian, Babylonian and Jewish culture were the several parts, how little do we know of its origin and splendour! Nay, how imperfect is our acquaintance even with its decline! What was its mundane function? What mission did it discharge to humanity as a whole? What was its transmitted effect upon classic civilisation? and how, through Judaism more especially, has it directly influenced the belief, and through it the philosophy, the literature and the entire moral and intellectual life of modern Europe? It is by such questions that we discover, if not the extent of our ignorance, at least the very narrow limitations of our knowledge.

Perhaps it may suffice us for the present to observe, that a grand process of edification went on, in that remote age and in that far eastern land, of which Judaism may be regarded as the great theological result, the highest form in which its theosophy finally crystallised into enduring shape, for transmission to posterity. And while religion was being thus duly cultured by the Semites, philosophy was

proportionately developed by the Aryans, who, as Persians, ultimately emerged into political supremacy on the ruins of Semitic power. Altogether, as we have observed, there was obviously a grand process of spiritual as well as political edification transacted in that remote age, of which we have inherited the results, though we are but imperfectly acquainted with the processes by which they were produced. To recur to our former figure, it was a great flood tide, that has left us, among other things, the Pyramids and the ruins of Thebes, the hieroglyphics and the cuneiform inscriptions, the Veda, the Avesta, and the Pentateuch.

But these great periods of edification are always followed by others of almost proportionate dilapidation, synthesis being supplemented by analysis, as life is followed by death, and day by night in the cyclical revolutions of nature. A time came when Asiatic thought-forms were to be subjected to the rather destructive process of European criticism. The earlier Ionian philosophy and the Pythagorean system of Magna Græcia show us the advancing waves of the great eastern inundation, as it impinged upon the classic races of the west. Under the reign of the Sophists antiquity was treated with some respect, but the Socratic method was fatal to a blind reverence, especially among a people so naturally analytical as the Greeks. Platonism was oriental theosophy robed in the intellectual vestments of philosophy. It was eastern faith, after its first Hellenian baptism. Under the Stagyrite, the European mind, as contradistinguished from the Asiatic, emerged into the full force of its strongly marked individuality, and that age of criticism was formally inaugurated which, commencing with Socrates, ended in the downfall of Olympus, and we may say the subversion of classic civilisation. Ere Alaric could enter Rome, it was necessary, not only that Cæsar should be conquered, but that Jove should be dethroned. We quite misunderstand matters when we think that everything was due to "the northern barbarians." The collapse of classic civilisation was entire, and implied the subsidence not merely of political power but also of traditional faith.

It is doubtful if we yet fully understand what "the decline and fall of the Roman empire" really meant. It was more than the fall of merely classic civilisation. It was the collapse of the ancient imperial system altogether, so that the world has never since seen its repetition, and never will again see it in its integrity, as a manifestation of purely physical force. The next great empire must be moral, for empire, as we hope hereafter to show, is inevitably coming, the empire of the west, the preparation for which is the existing diffusion of Semitic faith, over the entire area of Greek and Roman civilisation, under the rival yet allied standards of the cross and the crescent.

Thus, then, we are landed at the dawn of another period of spiritual synthesis, eventuating in the double pontificate of the Christian popes and Mohammedan caliphs.

To fully understand the rise of this duplex spiritual power upon the ruins of the political edifice which had preceded it, we should remember that Rome was the summation of the ancient imperial system, and the grandest instance of political synthesis upon record. In her the merely military phase of empire culminated, and in doing so became partially moral, as we see by her code, that enduring evidence of her wisdom and experience in legislation. The truly moral or rather spiritual phase of the Roman empire was however manifested in the papacy and the caliphate, and in the former more purely than the latter.

"The ages of faith" were a period of edification, during which the Catholic church sedulously endeavoured to build up the waste places of the earth. Sustained by a sublime inspiration, she laboured to reduce chaotic multiplicity and confusion to the order and beauty of a unitary creation. She sought to make one creed—her own; one language—the Latin; and one philosophy—the Aristotelian; or rather that of the schools, which somewhat inappropriately bore this name,—suffice for all the higher requirements of humanity. We should not blame her for this. It was a necessity of the age. It was simply the flood tide, that has left us the splendour of our cathedrals and the ruins of our abbeys, as its memorial wavemark on the sands of time. And it is a somewhat noteworthy coincidence that, as architecture and statuary attained most nearly to perfection during the declining ages of classic heathenism as a faith, when the elements of thought, that in their union with Judaism afterwards crystallised into Christianity, were in the process of elaboration, so again architecture and painting attained to their culmination in the Catholic church just previous to the Reformation, while the principles that afterwards eventuated in Protestantism were in a state of preparatory fermentation. These things are not accidents. They are obviously the product of a law, whose operation we should investigate, in the hope of attaining to an intelligible solution of its phenomena.

Is not this efflorescence of the fine arts towards the termination of a faith a phenomenon akin to the corresponding development of literature and philosophy? The Greek intellect not only produced Phidias and Praxiteles, but also Æschylus and Plato, as rays of that sunset splendour wherewith the Olympian faith bid the world its grand adieu. So also the Catholic church not only gave us Raphael and Michael Angelo and Leonardo da Vinci, but also Dante and Tasso and Ariosto, to say nothing of Cervantes and other transalpine stars of

that galaxy, that made "the revival of learning," using that phrase in its widest chronological import, so deservedly illustrious. These things are a part of that general development and culmination of intellect, which is not only an accompanying circumstance, but also a producing cause of the supercession of the old and outworn by the new and regenerated faith.

As the ebb infallibly follows the flood tide, so does an age of analysis succeed one of synthesis. Mediæval orthodoxy was followed by modern Protestantism, with its adjuncts and accompaniments, the inductive philosophy and vernacular literature. The one church was split up into many sects, the one language reappeared in many dialects. It was the decline, and will lead eventually to the fall of the spiritual Roman empire. It is a most mistaken idea that this process of analysis is confined to religion. It extends to politics, philosophy, letters and life. The schoolmaster feels it at his desk. The father finds it in the family. It is *authority*, in the abstract, that is dethroned, and the pope and the king experience it in common with all other central powers. It promises to be the most stupendous ebb on record. As material Rome was the greatest political edifice ever reared, and its fall the greatest political subsidence of which history is cognisant, so spiritual Rome was the grandest ecclesiastical structure that the human mind ever devised, and its subsidence must be proportionate to its splendour. As in material Rome, the old empire of force culminated; as it was the grand summation of ancient civilisation, so in spiritual Rome, the old empire of superstition attained to its maximum of power and influence, and in it the hierarchical organisation of the ancient priesthoods arrived at culmination.

These are facts which concern us as anthropologists. The empires and the hierarchies which preceded Rome were oriental in character. They wanted that sustained force and commanding intellectual power which can only be obtained from the ethnic basis of a European population. Babylon never attained to the far-seeing policy or the legislative wisdom of political Rome, nor were her magi or even those of Egypt comparable either for polemical astuteness or for forecasting and absolutely mundane ambition, to the surpliced priests and tonsured monks, that obey the tiara'd pontiff on the Tiber. We have seen what the Classic race could do for political and spiritual empire. The world has yet to see what their successors still farther west will accomplish, with yet greater means and fully equal capacity.

We have said that the present age of analysis promises to be the most thorough and searching upon record. Never before was the critical examination of faith and tradition so daring and exhaustive. Never before was scholarly scepticism so well equipped with the means

for doing successful battle with popular belief. Never before did science occupy such lofty vantage-ground as compared with revelation. And never before were the "masses" so open to the direct action of all these disintegrative influences. The old theology is obviously doomed. It simply waits for the execution of its sentence. Nor is the political horizon less marked by the portents of instability. Here, too, as in theology, the movement dates far beyond the existing generation. The English wars of the Commonwealth indicate the extension of excitement from the theological to the political sphere, this transference commencing perhaps with the thirty years' war in Germany, and culminating in the French Revolution. But the movement is obviously not going to stop at the political, for it is now penetrating the social sphere, and making claims to which science cannot but demur. Democracy has long demanded political equality for all the citizens of one homogeneous community, but we now also hear of the political and social equality of diverse races, based on the assertion, or rather the gratuitous assumption of organic and intellectual equality among all the strikingly characterised varieties of mankind. Of these stupendous claims, the late civil war in America was a result. Having arrived at Negro suffrage and miscegenation, we must assuredly be at "the beginning of the end"—at least in *theory*. Fortunately for the world there is moral as well as physical friction, and abstract ideas are always brought up a long way short of their hypothetical range. Resistance ultimately becomes equal to impulse, and the impetuous strangers having expended their force, sink into respectable quiescence, like their neighbours and predecessors.

To thoroughly understand a man, we must know something of the age in which he lived. It is more than the framework to the picture. In a certain sense, it is the mould to the metal. Do as he may he cannot wholly escape its influences. The Roman authors of the imperial age differ not merely in style but in tone from those formed under the republic; and among ourselves, the men of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries are easily distinguishable. They were obviously reared in different schools, and in this connection it is therefore perhaps of some importance to observe that Auguste Comte was born in 1798, amidst the seething cauldron of the French revolution. Civil commotion and foreign war, constituted the pabulum of his childhood; from his royalist parents he must have learned their conservative version of the reign of terror. While the immediate thunderpeals of Marengo and Wagram, Jena and Austerlitz reverberated through the dawning consciousness of his early childhood, the retreat from Russia, the retirement to Elba, and the final defeat at

Waterloo, constituted the experiences of his youth. Such were his first impressions of public life, of the outer world of politics. He was reared in imperial France, amidst the smoke of battle-fields, and saw, while yet a boy, the fall of empire and the restoration of monarchy; nor were his surroundings as a student in anywise more congenial. He beheld an established religion in which the great majority disbelieved, enforcing a code of morals that few practised, and, as a necessary accompaniment of this, he found a government that was unstable, and a social fabric that was rotten. He was trained in a philosophy devoid of depth, and in a science whose facts were outgrowing its principles; and, lastly, he became familiar with a literature that was purposeless and a drama that was vicious. Poor M. Comte, with his earnest and systematic, and perhaps we may add, fundamentally devotional mind, it is no wonder that he felt ill at ease in such an atmosphere. To his pure soul Paris must have seemed a Circean sty, reeking with filth and abomination, beneath the thin disguise of a vicious, because effete civilisation. To such a thinker, so circumstanced, the conclusion was inevitable, that the world wanted regeneration and reorganisation. He saw, with the penetrating and intuitive glance of genius, that in all the higher departments of thought and action, the work of destruction had been effectually accomplished; that we were drawing towards the end of an era, the close of a dispensation, and that the only true duty remaining to be accomplished was that of a master builder, and so, with a confidence no less rare than admirable, he offered himself as the befitting restorer, the competent architect of a ruined but recoverable world.

Ere we can duly estimate either the success or the failure of M. Comte in this stupendous undertaking, we must understand what it is which the world really wants. It has been already shown that we are nearly at the termination of an age of analysis, and that consequently a period of synthesis must be closely awaiting us. Hence, then, we may clearly perceive, that M. Comte was not an accident, but on the contrary a normal, and in a sense, necessary product of the age. He and his system were wanted—they, or something better. What, then, is it which is wanted? What are the present legitimate demands of civilisation in reference, primarily, to religion—for it is principally under this aspect that we propose to consider the subject of Positivism on the present occasion; the aspect, we may observe, under which it was regarded as of most importance, both by its founder and by some of his most distinguished disciples.

The distinctive feature of the religious world from Britain to Japan is present effeteness, combined with the strong expectancy of almost

immediate regeneration. Everywhere the signs of utter exhaustion are apparent; more especially is this the case throughout the East. Brahmanism and Buddhism are gone, and the faith of Islam is going; and the hopelessness of these Oriental creeds arises from the fact that they are socially and intellectually, as well as religiously effete. But it is otherwise with Christendom. Here we are at the very focus of mundane activity and human progression. The Christian peoples are the hope of the world, and somewhere within their area, therefore, must we expect the process of mundane regeneration to commence. What then is our condition, and what are our wants as a result of it? The ethnic speciality of the faith of Christendom consists in the fact that it is largely imported, that it is not, except by extensive modification, a normal product of the Aryan, or, shall we say, Indo-European branch of the Caucasian stock. It is Semitic in its roots. It is a part of that invasion, by which the Classic and Celtic races were overwhelmed in the hour of their effeteness. Despite its many modifications it is still largely alien to the racial thought forms of European peoples. It is so from the preponderance of its Semitic over its Aryan elements. Let us explain our meaning more definitely.

The Semitic races are predominantly moral in their mental constitution, while the Indo-Europeans are as predominantly intellectual. Now, it is because existent Christianity does not make adequate provision for this latter attribute; that it is failing in the present age of racial reemergence. It has also another source of weakness, more especially in relation to Europe; it is too Oriental in its estimate of women. Under the Mosaic system woman found no recognised place in the temple; and Christianity is still so far Judaic in its essential character, that she cannot serve at the altar. We hear many polite euphuisms about what Christianity has done for women, but the historic fact remains, that under Classic, Celtic and Teutonic heathenism, she was a priestess and a physician, she is now a tract-distributor and a nurse. There is not, we believe, a church in Christendom, that permits her to distribute the sacred elements. Even the most daring sectaries shrink from so dire a profanation of things holy. This cannot continue. It is contrary to the genius of the European, and more especially of the Celtic and Teutonic mind, and must give place eventually to a nobler estimate of the place and prerogatives of womanhood in the spiritual scheme of things. The deficiency of Christianity, then, as a world religion,—if such a thing, except in a very modified sense, be virtually possible,—arises from its want of due adaptation to the higher intellectual proclivities of the European mind. It wants farther modification and expansion. It is

in the process of undergoing this. It became æsthetic under the church of Rome; it is becoming, or rather preparing to become, literary and scientific, under the church of the future.

Religion is immortal: its manifestations may be Protean, but its essence is indestructible. It is the grandest product of the human mind, and the mightiest power that society has ever developed. Notwithstanding the vast changes to which it has been subjected, both in doctrine and ritual, its existence has been continuous, and its growth probably uninterrupted. The great theological revolutions which loom out upon us through tradition, and which at a later period constitute some of the most important subject matter of history, were not casual incidents, but orderly phenomena, necessarily developed in a certain sequence, by the interaction of races and the general progress of humanity. And we are now, from both causes, approaching another period of crisis. The European peoples, or nationalities, as they are sometimes termed, are, anthropologically speaking, emerging from the ruder effects of their ethnic baptism, at the period of the Gothic conquest. The alien elements then introduced, having produced their due result of invigoration, are scaling off, and Greek and Italian, Celt and Iberian, are reappearing in their olden features, with simply the normal growth of an ethnic era superadded. But is there to be no other scaling off? Are not the alien ideas, like the alien races then introduced, a foreign product, to be absorbed and assimilated, or if not susceptible of this process, to be expelled? Does not an entire reemergence of the European peoples imply this? Is it within the limits of ethnic possibility, that a peculiarly vigorous type, both mentally and physically, like the European in all its varieties, should submit to an indefinite prolongation of moral domination on the part of another, if not inferior type, like that of the Semites? And yet this is exactly what would be implied by the permanence of our existing forms of thought in matters of faith and religious conviction.

Such a supposition as that alluded to at the close of the foregoing paragraph, however probable it may seem to the theologian, is, it need scarcely be said, utterly untenable on anthropological grounds. In truth, the doctrinal modification which Christianity has already undergone, and by which it is distinguished from both Judaism and the faith of Islam, demonstrates that a purely Semitic faith could not prevail over an Aryan area, even in its hour of ethnic collapse. Neither, on the other hand, will the laws of progression allow us to suppose that Europe, having once received and assimilated so much of the higher elements of Semitism as are involved in Christianity, will again finally surrender them for an inferior creed. She may,

and no doubt will, superadd her own intellectual elements to them, but will never again yield up those grander veracities, which by prolonged adoption have become, in a sense, her own.

What, then, is the essential character of that faith, to which, from a variety of causes, racial, political, theological and philosophical, Europe is steadily and irresistibly tending?—And we reply, a religion as grandly monotheistic as that of the noblest of the Semites, as purely moral and as sweetly beneficent as the finest phase of even theoretic Christianity, together with an intellectual element super-added of which both are more or less devoid. This is simply saying in effect, that from the biparentage of ancient faith and modern civilisation, we shall obtain an offspring superior to either; it is the world-old process that was effected in the conjunction of patriarchal faith with Egyptian wisdom, and in the subsequent union of Judaic theology with Hellenic philosophy; it does not imply the destruction of Christianity, but its renovation—not its death, but its resurrection. It is the foremost shoot of the mystic Ygdrasil, and although of necessity the last year's shoot, and now perchance of somewhat sapless and winterly aspect, must nevertheless prove the more immediate parent of the present year's growth. To suppose that it can be put aside and ignored as of no account, is simply absurd. To use another simile, it is "the old foundation," compared with which every other is of sand, nor will any true master builder reject or despise it, in his attempted edification of the future.

Granting, then, the truth of our conclusion, that Europe must ultimately produce a faith more suited to her spiritual necessities than existent Christianity, the question remains, on which of her races will this great mission finally devolve? and we reply, not on the Classic. Their force has been already expended in the modification of Christianity, whose doctrine and ritual, in so far as they depart from their Judaic originals, are, the former Greek and the latter Roman, or if the term be preferred, Italic. Not the Teutonic. They are not sufficiently constructive. They are doing their appointed work in the critical analysis of the existing faith. It is their business to remove the rubbish of error, not to lay the foundations of truth or rear the superstructure of beauty. It is almost needless to mention the Slavons; they have never created anything, being simply receptive of the thought forms of higher types. There remain, then, only the Teutonised Celts of the West, now apparently in the process of emergence into mundane supremacy; and to fully understand their position in relation either to the religion or the empire of the future, we must take another short historical survey.

In accordance with those comparatively recent annals which con-

stitute written history, we have been accustomed to regard Asia as not only the cradle of mankind, but also as the aboriginal seat of civilisation. Nor is this matter for astonishment. During the last four or five thousand years empire has been marching north-westwards. It came out of the east, and in its train has followed that religion, which now prevails over the whole western world. Hence all our more immediate experiences point to an oriental origin of things. But anthropology, archæology, and philology, as they carry us down to profounder depths, do not altogether confirm this conclusion. In the first place, we have ample present evidence that Europe is the highest Ethnic area in the world. Its racial types are the most vigorous both in body and mind, and indeed it is not too much to say that the West, and not the East, of the old world, seems to be the especial seat of, at least, the Aryan division of the Caucasian race; while recent philological and archæological investigations seem to indicate that an Allophylian, or Semimongolian, type, with an agglutinated language, preceded the Semites, even on the banks of the Euphrates and the Tigris. Thus, then, it would appear that the Turanian, and not the Caucasian, is the especially Asian type of humanity; or, at farthest, that the latter is confined to the western and Mediterranean border of the continent. Should this be confirmed, the claims of Asia as the aboriginal fountain of any higher religion or philosophy must be regarded as more than questionable.

True archæology, as contradistinguished from dilettante antiquarianism, is yet too much in its infancy for confidently basing our conclusions as to the condition of prehistoric man on its revelations. But it is an important fact in connection with these speculations, that on the primitive Celtic area of the north-west we find the dawn of architecture in the monoliths, cromlechs, and so-called druidical remains of Britain and France; while in the Cyclopean ruins of Italy and Greece we seem to trace the successive stages of progress in art, from the unhewn block, innocent of tool, up to the still vast but perfect parallelogram, affording ample evidence not merely of the mechanical, but also the masonic, skill of the mighty builders who prevailed to place these gigantic masses in position. It would, perhaps, be rather premature to assert positively that the pyramids of Egypt are recent as compared with the walls of Tiryns and Mycenæ; but it is not too much to say that the general current of archæological evidence is flowing in that direction.

Again, true philology, as contradistinguished from mere verbal pedantry, is too recent and imperfect to prove more than merely suggestive in inquiries like the present. But the great inflectional languages of the early Aryans are clearly indicative of a prehistoric

antiquity of yet unknown duration, when these mighty forms of ancient speech were being slowly built up into the grandeur and compression which we find in the Sanscrit and its allied tongues. We know how long it has taken to thoroughly break down these glorious modes of utterance into the baby-talk of India and modern Europe, and is it to be supposed that it took a shorter time to build them up? And as to the primitive area of these Aryan peoples, the true Ethnic seat of the race, by what satisfactory evidence have we transferred this from thoroughly Aryanised Europe into the heart of Turanian and Semitic Asia? Is not this simply a worthless corollary from the foregone conclusion of an Asian origin for all things, itself the baseless tradition of the Semitic tribes of Palestine?

It is not, then, too much to assert that the tendency of modern inquiry is to indicate the probability of a great prehistoric cycle of civilisation and progress, which, commencing in the north-west, moved south-east till it reached the Ganges. The movement which constitutes history proper, being the exact reverse of this, that is, the return wave from the south-east to the north-west; now it is very obvious, concentrating with especial force upon Britain, the geographical terminus, where it must culminate, preparatory to the resumption of its south-eastern march, during the ages of a yet unrevealed, though we have reason to believe stupendous future of classic and oriental restoration. These we grant are rather wild speculations, as whatever takes in so large a sweep of time and space must necessarily be, in the present imperfect state of our information. But we have thrown out these hints to indicate the possible dignity of the Celtic area from a historical standpoint, as being, in a sense, the source and terminus of these great oscillations that carry empire and civilisation in their train.

As an additional indication of the Ethnic grade of the Celtic area, more especially in relation to religion, let us compare the geographical divisions of Asia with those of Europe. That there is a certain racial and moral relationship between the two continents, in virtue of which the areas of the one correspond, in a measure, to those of the other, however inexplicable the fact may be in the present imperfect state of our information, will scarcely admit of a doubt. Thus, Mongolia corresponds to Sclavonia, Tartary to Germany, India to Italy, Arabia to Spain, and Persia to France. But if so, then where is the correlated European area of Syria, and perhaps Asia Minor? and we answer unhesitatingly, the British Isles. Judging, then, by the indications afforded through this line of representative affinities, M. Comte might have been the Zoroaster, but scarcely the Mohammed or the Jesus of the world's theological future. It would

not, however, be wise to lay too much stress on conclusions derived from data as yet so imperfectly understood, and we will, therefore, conclude this portion of the subject by simply remarking that there is an obvious Ethnic relationship between the Semites of western Asia and the Celts of western Europe, and that if the latter continent is ever destined to complete the historic epicycle of the former, by the development of a mundane religion, M. Comte seems to have come of the race of the prophets!

But prophets hitherto have always been of a rather peculiar type of character. All history testifies to the fact, that successful architects in the spiritual sphere ever laid claim to preternatural power and supernatural illumination. They taught not through reason, but with authority, and fortified the demand of unquestioning obedience to their dictates by speaking as the delegates of Deity. They were healers and wonderworkers, and utterers of dark and vaticinatory sayings. Perhaps M. Comte and his disciples may say that the age for such things is past, to which we reply, then so also is the age for the founding of a religion, as that term has been heretofore understood and exemplified. The truth seems to be that this worthy man confounded the philosopher and the prophet, and because he had some rightful claims to the former character, thought he might therefore successfully enact the part of the latter. Poor fellow; a prophet without a God, without spiritual insight, devoid of miraculous power, and without the gift of prediction, and having himself no faith in immortality—verily it is doubtful if this nineteenth century has presented a spectacle so truly pitiable.

But Auguste Comte, there is reason to believe, not only misconceived the attributes proper to a prophet, and so grievously misapprehended his own vocation in the world, but that he also equally misapprehended the attributes in humanity to which religious tuition should be primarily addressed. He appealed to the intellectual faculties, and thought that his religion would be received, because it was rational. But religions have always been accepted, because they were thought to be divine. Auguste Comte was not only a philosopher, but his system was a philosophy of life—simply that, and nothing more. It was thoroughly human, both in its origin and its aims; but all successful and permanent religions have claimed to be superhuman. They have always announced their grander truths as direct revelations from the supersensuous sphere, and these truths were promulgated as having an important and practical bearing, not only on time, but also on eternity. It is, of course, unavoidable, that in systems so characterised, the founder should teach with authority, and not as a philosopher, and if M. Comte and his friends were un-

prepared for this, they had better not have given us a "religion," but something with a title far less pretentious.

But it is time that we should examine Positivism in some of its details, as a system professing to be the future religion of humanity. And here let us do justice to the grandeur and truthfulness of M. Comte's fundamental idea, that what the world now really wants is reconstruction. We are approaching the termination of a critical and disintegrative era, so truly mundane in its area, that every religion in the world is effete. It need scarcely be said, that, as an accompaniment of this, every system of philosophy is unsettled, and the entire constitution of society, in all its aspects, is unsafe. The old beliefs have vanished, the ancient loyalties have departed, throughout not only western Europe, but the greater part of Asia. The dilapidation is universal, and the only certitudes left us are those of science, with whose reorganisation, therefore, M. Comte was wise in beginning. He was also quite right in regarding Europe, where there is still intellectual life beneath the ribs of a moral death, as the area of re-emergence. But was he equally right in regarding the Protestant countries as largely excluded from this area? Is it not precisely at the point of greatest disintegration, that we should expect reconstruction to commence. Catholicism is too well organised to permit of reorganisation. It is in Protestant countries that religious disintegration has been carried farthest; and it is there, consequently, that we should expect the commencement of organisation. To be definite, we regard Britain and not France as the point of crystallisation.

Let us enter somewhat more minutely into this matter. France is yet politically and religiously at the purely negative stage; she has destroyed monarchy to leave anarchy—restrained by the sword of a military despotism; so in religion, where she is not papal, she is sceptical. Ethnically, this is due to the fact that she presents a Celtic area, very inadequately baptised by Teutonic blood, so that a very large moiety of her population are physically effete rather than regenerated Gauls. Geographically, it is due to the fact that she is not the true terminus of the great north-western march of empire and civilisation. But it is otherwise with Britain. Here the reorganising tendency is clearly manifest. The English have long practically understood that "to destroy you must replace." As they limited the monarchical, they developed the representative element in government; and, as they destroyed the papal, they developed a Protestant hierarchy; and the Ethnic source of this ability to evolve and work appropriate institutions is, that they are Celts, thoroughly baptised by Teutonic blood, and so fitted without further aid for

another cycle of progress and power ; while the geographical cause is, that they are at the terminus of the north-western march of empire, and so at its inevitable point of culmination, where reorganisation commences.

We have already said that M. Comte committed a fatal error in promulgating a religion without a God. Such a solecism involved two grave mistakes. It was in the first place, a retrogression in thought. Monotheism is the grandest religious idea to which the human mind has yet attained. It is the bourne to which humanity has tended through countless ages, and having once attained, the laws of progress assure us that it will never surrender it for an inferior conception. You may displace one God by another. Jehovah may succeed Moloch. And the angry and jealous Deity of the Pentateuch may be superseded by the loving and longsuffering Father of the Gospels. But a revealed Deism will never finally succumb to a philosophic Pantheism. If you would destroy the God of your superstitious countrymen, replace him by a better ; he will never yield to a mere negation. In the next place, M. Comte, by this procedure, severed himself from the past. Positivism is not a living growth out of Christianity, but a madeup system of philosophy standing in direct antagonism to it. It is not a branch of the mystic Ygdrasil, with the lifesap of the ages circulating through it, but a pretty little hothouse plant, from the great Paris conservatory of thought, that would perish in a day if exposed unprotected to the rude blasts of a northern winter.

Another grave mistake of M. Comte, only secondary to his fatal omission of Deity, was his practical denial of immortality. Now as monotheism is the grandest idea yet attained in relation to God, so his afterexistence is the noblest conception yet developed in reference to man, and although schemes of philosophy may be propounded without it, no system of religion can venture to ignore it. You may displace an inferior by a superior conception of immortality, but with the idea itself you can never dispense. The source of M. Comte's error in these omissions was his confounding religion with philosophy. He did not seem to know that God and immortality are intuitions of the spirit not conclusions of the intellect, that they are sublime veracities, primarily revealed by seers, not simple truths, carefully elaborated by metaphysicians. Perhaps this matter requires a little farther illustration.

In any enumeration of the world's masterspirits, it is impossible to omit the prophet. How in any true history of humanity can you ignore such beings as Moses, Christ, or Mohammed ? Why as actual forces, all the philosophers that ever lived weigh but as a feather in the balance against them. Now after allowing for all the exaggera-

tions of tradition, it is very obvious that these mighty seers, these great architects of faith, constitute a special order of intelligences, having certain generic features in common, and in virtue of which they differ, not only from the mass, but also from other men of genius. And primarily in the order of their distinctive attributes, we may enumerate their constitutional susceptibility to supersensuous illumination, or as the mesmerists would say, to spontaneous clairvoyance, implying, it need scarcely be said, much else. But of all this M. Comte knew nothing, and so was enabled to confidently propound himself as a world's prophet, on the stock-in-trade of a Parisian savant.

But omitting this consideration, as being perhaps rather too esoteric for uninitiated readers, let us contemplate this Godless faith of the scientific Frenchman, from the ethnic standpoint. Upon any enlarged and really philosophic view of the great religions of the world, their adaptation to racial specialities becomes at once manifest. Judaism and the faith of Islam are obviously Semitic creeds. They are unitary and masculine, and reveal God, not as the indwelling force of nature, but as her creator, as a selfsubsistent spiritual entity, dwelling above and beyond her. In reality, as the infinite and eternal contradistinguished from the finite and temporal. This is revealed Deism. Now Brahminism and Buddhism are as obviously Aryan creeds, that is, they are essentially pantheistic, and see God, not *above*, but *in* nature. Hence their cardinal doctrine of incarnation, the divine human being the highest possible form of the spiritual and eternal manifesting itself in the material and temporal. Now in Christianity we have a combination of the two, that is, we have a Semitic God as creator and an Aryan incarnation as intercessor, the tendency being, in accordance with our racial proclivities, to prefer the latter to the former. Indeed the thorough Aryan will assert stoutly, that it is quite impossible to approach God except through Christ, although if he would only look abroad he might see Jew and Moslem doing the thing every day. Under Catholicism, the adoration of the Virgin and the invocation of Saints, show us the lingering Semitism of Christianity, largely overlaid by the pantheistic proclivities of the classic race. Now the system of M. Comte is in reality this adoration of the Virgin—that is of the woman, and this invocation of Saints—that is of select humanity, with every trace of intruding Semitism thoroughly eliminated. It is the pure pantheism of the Latin nations, at its germinal stage, before a formal and avowed polytheism has had adequate time for development.

Now it must not be supposed that the foregoing amounts to a sentence of entire condemnation. Pantheism has its legitimate domain

in the religious sphere. The fact that it is the religion of the Aryan or intellectual division of the Caucasian race, as contradistinguished from Monotheism, the creed of the Semites or moral division, may suffice to show that it is not without its rightful claims on our attention. In truth, what humanity now needs, as we have already hinted, is not the entire supercession of one of these creeds by the other, but their union in a prolific marriage for the production of a third, combining the good qualities of both, and thus superior to either. In a sense Christianity was the beginning of this process, and what the world is about to see, is its continuation. Judaism and Hellenism were the representative types respectively of Semitic and Aryan thought, and as they coalesced under the political supremacy of Alexander and his successors, and interfused amidst the cosmopolitanism of all-absorbing Rome, Christianity was the result. Such elements of progress as the world then afforded were thus absorbed and assimilated, and what we now want is a similar absorption and assimilation of its present elements. These are still the loftiest and purest Monotheism of the morally developed Semites, and the philosophy, literature, science and art, not omitting even the direct religious Pantheism of the intellectually expanded Aryans. We now then begin to understand something of M. Comte's real mission and of that inspiration of the age which urged him to its fulfilment. He was not the world's "coming man". He had neither the moral elevation or the true intellectual expansiveness requisite for this, to say nothing of the more than heroic energy and poetic inspiration that go to make up our conception of the world's future prophet. He could not take in both sides of the problem. He was too thoroughly a Pantheistic Aryan to properly appreciate the grandeur and importance of the Semitic elements, in promoting the religious development of humanity. But from this very speciality in his mental constitution, he was, perhaps, all the more qualified for assisting in the arrangement and classification of the sciences, and in otherwise organising the Aryan elements of progress prior to their assimilation as integral parts of the religion of the future.

Let us enter somewhat more minutely into this subject. Monotheism is the sublimest conception which has yet been formed by the mind of man. It is, indeed, so grand and so lofty, so positive and so masculine, that under its best form, as among the Jews, it is utterly destructive of art, and cannot rear even its own temple. While under its ruder and severer aspect, as proclaimed by the desertborn son of the Koreish, it ends, as we see in all Mohammedan countries, in political decay and physical desolation. Nor is this matter for astonishment, for it is only a half truth. It asserts the divinity of God, while

by implication it denies the divinity of nature, and therefore of man, the child of nature. Hence the necessity for the Aryan element of Pantheism, which so loudly proclaims this divinity, and even asserts its distinct incarnational manifestation. For a full religious development, there must not only be a worship of God, but also in a sense, a worship of nature, and at least a glorification of humanity. Now it is this glorification, this veritable apotheosis of humanity which constitutes the fundamental truth of Christianity, and gives it its acknowledged power over the Aryans of the West. Just as the same doctrine, gives the great incarnational faiths of the East their hold upon the Aryans of Asia, and through them, upon their ruder neighbours, and in a sense congeners, the Turanian populations of the farther Orient. For a full proclamation of the divinity of nature, albeit it is the major and inclusive premiss, and in due logical sequence should have preceded a recognition of the divinity of man, we have yet to wait. But for this the labours of modern science are, as our religious friends might say, a providential preparation.

We have been severe on M. Comte, or rather on his doctrines. But this was unavoidable. His mistakes were so grave and his pretensions so preposterous, that to expose them was to condemn him. Let there be no misapprehension in this matter, however. For Auguste Comte, as a private individual, we entertain the most profound respect. As the organiser of science the world will ever be his debtor. But as the would-be founder of religion, we regard him with a pity bordering on contempt. It must not be supposed, however, that he proclaimed nothing but errors, or that his labours were altogether useless, or as some would assert, decidedly mischievous. He appeared as the herald of reorganisation in an age of chaos. Although not the true Demiurgus, he was doubtless his precursor, and as a sign the importance of his advent cannot well be overestimated. He came too at the right time and of the right people for the work which he had to perform, the classification of the sciences preparatory to their recognition and absorption as a part of the impending religion to humanity. With this, some may, perhaps, think that he should have been content. But it should be remembered that France has a social as well as an intellectual mission, and perhaps her inspired son spoke under compulsion in the one case as well as the other. Of M. Comte as a religious founder we have already expressed our opinion. Let us now look at him as a social reformer; and here we must again refer to his religious system, but this time, not as an embodiment of doctrine, but as a scheme of ecclesiastical polity.

Religion implies a priesthood. If you permit the former, you cannot refuse the latter, for it is but the visible organ through which the

invisible life discharges its functions. It is but the material vesture in which the immaterial spirit has prevailed to clothe itself. A hierarchy is the ecclesiastical necessity of a spiritual age, and so we may say, in other language, the inevitability of a reconstructive era. Such an assertion is of course very unpalatable to destructives, but it is none the less a veracity, resting on the ever accumulating experience of the ages. So far from humanity outgrowing this, it is on the contrary growing into it. A true hierarchy is utterly unknown to the Negro, and but imperfectly so to the Turanian, for the Buddhism of the latter, whether in doctrine, organisation, or ritual, is an importation from Aryan India. Nigritia has its Obiman and Mongolia its Shaman, till assisted from without.

This very fact, that a hierarchy is the special product of Caucasian culture, must ever give this complex form of ecclesiastical organisation an interest of no common order to the true anthropologist. In it must be reflected some of the noblest instincts, shall we say, some of the grandest inspirations of the highest type of humanity. In its perfect form, a hierarchy is the organ of a theocracy. It was this once ; it will be this again when the epicycle has fully revolved. To this the Papacy was an approximation. It was this in theory, but not in fact ; it was a promise of which we yet await the fulfilment. Now a theocracy almost implies not merely a divine founder, but also under some form a continuity of the divine presence. The Grand Lama is presumably a reincarnation, and even the Pope professes to be Christ's vicar ; and in his official capacity as head of the Church is supposed to possess so much of living inspiration as to justify his claim to doctrinal infallibility. It need scarcely be said that Protestants do not understand this, but if wise they would know that every simulacrum implies somewhere or somewhen a real presence. Perhaps they will recollect, as they are familiar with Biblical instances, that under the Semitic theocracy of the Israelites, among whom, from racial proclivities already specified, an avowed incarnation would have been distasteful, there was the (to Moses) visible descent on Sinai, and (to the high priest) the permanently visible shekinah between the cherubim. After such considerations as the foregoing, poor M. Comte's miserable savants, with the influence of women but without the power of men, are so irresistibly suggestive of the ridiculous, that perhaps, in mercy to his memory and to the feelings of his living disciples, the less we say about them the better ! Suffice it that hierarchies in their splendour have always used princes as their puppets, and should they be destined to another culmination, will doubtless do so once again, the solemn remonstrances of revolutionists and the stringent regulations of M. Comte to the contrary notwithstanding !

And here let us pause for a moment to contemplate the childish confidence and well-meaning self-sufficiency of this great and good but sadly mistaken man. A Celtic-Gaul, without the shadow of a suspicion that his Aryan specialities as a Pantheist, utterly disqualified him as a doctrinal teacher, for leadership among the Monotheistic Semites, he nevertheless proceeds to promulgate a world religion in which there is no God ! Practically ignorant also of the great law of progress, that mankind never give up any one form of truth to which they have attained, till it has been superseded by another and a higher, he thought the Christians of Europe would surrender their belief in immortality for a participation in the cheerless celebrity of his *grand être*. Then, proceeding to found a hierarchy of intellect, he thinks to limit their power through all ages by a few arbitrary rules laid down in his study at Paris. What a stupendous ignorance is revealed in these few but cardinal errors. Ignorance of race, ignorance of history, ignorance of the fundamental laws of human progress. It is very obvious that M. Comte really knew nothing of racial speciality in reference either to religion or government. And it is equally obvious that he was oblivious of the great truth, that empires and hierarchies have their own laws of growth and decay, and are in each, not only independent of arbitrary rules, but also to a considerable extent even of disturbing forces.

Returning, however, from this almost personal digression, let us, ere concluding this portion of the subject, make a few more remarks on priesthood and its functions. A hierarchy is, strictly speaking, an organisation of the cultured intellect of any given time and area. It is a most mistaken idea that it numbers only the celebrant clergy. It did more than this, even in the rudest ages. It embraces also the lawyers, whose judges answer to the bishops, the physicians and men of science, the artists and men of letters, whose poets are an order of subprophets. In other words a hierarchy is tantamount not merely to the clergy, but also to the clerisy of the land, and this too in a state of efficient organisation. Now the speciality of these latter ages, using that term in a rather wide sense, is the disorganisation of this body, accompanied of course, by a great diminution of its recognised dignity and formal power. And perhaps it is in perfect keeping with this, that the most spiritual of all its orders, the men of letters, in truth as we have said, its very prophets should be the most thoroughly disorganised, veritable Ishmaelites of the desert of civilisation, unvestured, untempled, and, it need scarcely be said, *unendowed* ! The truth, however, is that the universities, with their gownsmen and professors, represent this branch of the great hierarchy of intelligence—albeit, perhaps, the traditional rather than the vital phase of the matter.

Now we can readily understand that this condition of things is quite satisfactory to John Stuart Mill and those who think with him. It is revolution realised. Hence his opposition to that portion of M. Comte's scheme which implies the reorganisation of the spiritual power. But in this, as in many other things, the founder of Positivism, however shortsighted in some respects, at least saw farther than the revolutionists, that is, he looked beyond them, over this age of chaos, into one of reconstruction, which, quite independently of any immediately presentable signs of its approaching advent, is obviously impending, if only from the law of action and reaction. But when it comes, and the ripples of the returning flood are distinctly visible, we may be sure that it will be with all the resistless force of a mundane tide, in regard to which human regulations and artificial obstacles are simply contemptible.

But if hierarchies, whether in their origin, growth, splendour, or decay, are subject to the operation of regular laws, so also are rubrics. The ceremonial of a religion is no more an accident than its doctrine. As the last is an inevitable development, from previously existing elements of thought, so the first is an unavoidable necessity, a practical result of previous example. The Church of Rome did not originate her vesture or her ordinances, nor, we may add, even the manner of their celebration. They are largely an inheritance, which, however, she has very wisely not allowed to lie barren. And however plain-sailing, simple-minded Protestants may object to it, there is no doubt they will prove very largely the germ, or shall we say foundation, of the rich and imposing ceremonial of the future. But Auguste Comte quite mistook his vocation in attempting to legislate on such matters, which, as we have said, are things not of arbitrary appointment but of irresistible growth, and that growth we may add in strict accordance with racial proclivities.

It is the same with architecture. Rome could no more help building her Gothic cathedrals, than she could avoid the celebration of mass. The Olympian faith is reflected in the Parthenon; while that of mediæval Christendom may be read in York Minster. The race and the faith determine the temple. Given a new faith, and you obtain its inevitable sequence, the requisite inspiration for a new style. It is the essentially transitional character of Protestantism, which renders its architecture so poor and imitative. It is not, strictly speaking, a faith, but simply the protest against an old and the preparation for a new one. Let no prophet, therefore, trouble himself about his temple, well knowing that all spirits become fittingly vested in due time. Alas! from how much needless trouble might would-be reformers often save themselves, by a little more reliance

on the divine yet simple law of GROWTH. These good people do not seem to understand that, if you would have an oak, you must plant an acorn—and wait the result. They, on the contrary, want to *make* their oak, and of course suffer ignominious defeat, at the hands of insulted and indignant nature, for their pains.

Now, we can easily understand that the disciples of M. Comte, while readily admitting the truth of these remarks in relation to such men as St. Simon and Robert Owen, will nevertheless vehemently deny their applicability to the founder of Positivism. And we grant that plenty of passages may be selected from his writings, most favourable to the slower processes of growth and development, and directly condemnatory of needless and useless interference. This, indeed, was his theory; which, however, his practice very commonly contradicted. Indeed, it would almost seem that he thought no one had a right to interfere with the historical continuity of human progress—except Auguste Comte! We quite grant that he was true to his theory in the systematisation of the sciences, which was a movement, as Father Newman would say, in the right line of development. But his Positive religion is a more decided breach of theological continuity, than anything of which history affords the practical example. In truth, one important element of its impracticability, is the fact that it does not grow out of, or directly rest upon, any antecedent system. This, however, is by no means the only instance in which M. Comte's theory and practice contradict each other. Thus, he is frequently speaking of *unity*, and yet his scheme for the temporal government of the world consists in the institution of an indefinite number of small republics, ruled by their principal capitalists. He apparently not seeing, that the only real *unity* possible, is under a theocratic autocracy, whereto his model republics are the opposite pole of multiplicity; poor, weak, *experimental* humanity, having generally had to content itself with something less extreme than either!

M. Comte's ignorance of race was fatal to his pretensions whether as a religious founder or as a social reformer, with a mundane mission. His area, not only of experience but also of outlook, was essentially European, where it was not still narrower, as being especially French. His geographical, and with this, his ethnic range, was far too contracted for a true humanitarian chieftain. And he laboured under a corresponding defect in reference to time. He was too much the child of the revolution. He mistook many of its essentially transitional and merely provisional arrangements, for the normal manifestation of governmental principles. His division of what may be called secular society, simply into capitalists and workmen, is an instance in point. France having destroyed her here-

ditary nobility, he thought such an institution unnecessary. It is obvious that he did not understand, and therefore did not believe in caste ; or, speaking anthropologically, of race within race. It was an idea, on which the revolution necessarily made war, and he accepted its levelling conclusions without investigation. The oracular voice of history was dumb to him on this subject—or perhaps he was deafened by the sound of the tumbrils, that conveyed the effete remains of Frankish chivalry to the guillotine. Here, again, his ignorance of race was made manifest. As the highest types have the greatest hierarchies, so have they, in their normal condition, the grandest nobilities. Feudalism is an impossibility in Nigritia. Let us clearly understand this matter. The hereditary transmission of type and quality of mind is a fact in Nature, and as speciality of endowment and individuality of character become more marked as you ascend in the scale of being, there is of course more diversity of type and quality in the higher races than the lower ; in other words, there is more material out of which to evolve the institution of caste, an inevitability of the future, as sure as it was an actuality of the past. Here, too, as in many other phases of reconstruction, it is very obvious that the movement has already commenced, and society is even now dividing into *horizontal* layers ; in truth, settling into parallel strata—as some people find to their unspeakable mortification. Now to this we already hear the revolutionists uniting in one consentient chorus of denial—which, however, does not alter the fact in nature. Even into this matter M. Comte saw further than they do, and clearly perceived that there must be an owning and a producing class ; but then, as he constituted his hierarchy out of savants, so he made his nobility out of capitalists, and as we have already remarked, the less said about either the better.

But there is another phase of this matter, for which also M. Comte's system makes no adequate provision—we allude to the conquest, and in a sense, colonisation, of the inferior by the superior races. Now, ethnically speaking, this is obviously to be the great feature of our more immediately impending future. Perhaps this needs some explanation. The racial event of the last two thousand years was the subsidence of the nervous and the military predominance of the muscular races. We see this from India to Britain ; the Tartar conquering Asia, and the Teuton subduing Europe. It was this movement which brought out not only Alaric and Attila, but also Togrul Beg and Alp Arslan, Genghis Khan and Tamerlane. The only great exception to it was in the rise of the Saracenic power of the Caliphs, ultimately overwhelmed in the resistless flood of Turcoman invasion. But this movement has now ceased. The

needful baptism of bone and muscle has been effected, and once more the nervous and intellectual races are assuming their rightful predominance. And it is observable that coincident with this, we see the seat of political supremacy transferred to the Celtic area of Gaul and Britain, in all probability the primæval site of Caucasian culture, and now about to enter upon the epicycle of its former greatness. As an additional evidence of the almost mundane extent of these racial tides, it is also noticeable, that while the Osmanlies were subduing the Greek, the Mantchou tribes were conquering their more civilised congeners, the Chinese. And now, when the Classic races of the south-west of Europe are recovering their former independence, the Celestials are preparing to throw off the yoke of the northern nomads. Action and reaction are, and probably have been from time immemorial, propagated from Britain to Japan, right across the major axis of the Old Continent, and as we now see, even into the New, the colonisation of America being simply a prolongation of that western movement of civilisation which constitutes the cardinal fact of history.

To pass however from these, perhaps, rather vague generalisations, into more practical details ; it is very obvious that Caucasian Christendom is now virtually the imperial centre of the world, and nothing but the petty jealousies of its rival nations, prevents their carrying this out into universal political supremacy, by means of military conquest, as the English have done in India and the Russians in Siberia. Asia must be, for a season, the appanage of Europe. Once more the Aryans will sweep out of their north-western home upon south-eastern conquests, but this time they will not be arrested by the Ganges but the Pacific Ocean. And is it conceivable that this should take place without the reappearance of caste ? not at first, perhaps, as a formal institution, but ultimately as an inevitable growth. We may be quite sure that the Caucasian and Turanian will never settle down together on equal terms, when the former is the master. Let us remember that *written* history can be no guide in this matter. It narrates little more than the gradual subjection of the superior by the inferior types. In a racial sense it is simply the chronicle of disintegration and revolution. To understand and truly forecast the era on which we are about to enter, we must go back to tradition and archaeology, to the period when India and Egypt were laying the foundation of their complex institutions. Short of this, historical instances will simply land us in error.

This matter goes down to greater depths than is usually supposed. As we have already shown in some former papers, the entire north-western march of civilisation was accompanied by a process of analysis and disintegration in language, institutions, and of course in ideas.

Now the opposite, or south-eastern march, will, we have every reason to believe, prove the very reverse of this ; that is, it will be a movement of edification, religious, political, social, and intellectual, being in all this but the epicycle of that prior movement whereof mythology, philology, and archæology are now our sole records. Granting this, it must be at once obvious that any system of religion or philosophy which does not take such an impending movement of humanity into account, must fall short of modern pretensions, and will fail in that grand era which awaits us in the future. Shall we be thought severe if we pronounce the Positive religion thus inadequate. Alas ! how much else in which mankind now place undoubting faith will also prove equally inadequate in that great day of account, so that Auguste Comte and his Parisian creed will not stand alone in the list of the rejected.

We have not yet exhausted the errors of M. Comte ; nor is there any reason why we should attempt the accomplishment of so great a feat. Our purpose was simply to contemplate Positivism as a religion from the racial standpoint. We think that, thus tested, it has proved insufficient. Our judges in this matter are not the general public and men of letters, nor even the smaller, and apparently yet more competent tribunal of men of science, but anthropologists alone, for they only are competent to decide such a question, and to them we commit its further consideration. But to thus conclude our review of the labours of so great a mastermind with merely a verdict of condemnation would, we feel, be not only ungrateful, but positively unjust. As we have said, M. Comte had many deficiencies utterly fatal to his astounding pretensions as "the coming man." He had neither the depth, or the grasp of thought, nor the more than poetic sublimity of conception, to qualify him for so stupendous an undertaking as the founding of a world's faith. He had not even the requisite attainments, for a knowledge of race is among the necessary qualifications of him who would legislate for any other people than his own. But with all these wants he was, in many points, beyond his age, and uttered truths for which the future will acknowledge itself his debtor. He saw beyond the revolution, and, as a consequence, proclaimed the necessity for reconstruction. To a certain extent he even effected this in his own, that is, the scientific sphere. And, indeed, it may be said, that wherever he was really guided by the true spirit of re-edification he was right, while wherever he was the child of the revolution he was wrong. He did a noble work in the systematisation of the sciences ; and even granting that the attempt was premature, it was still the life-labour of a giant, in his task as a pioneer. He was correct, too, in his assertion that we want a reconstitution of

the spiritual power. But he was as decidedly in error when he would have erected this stately edifice on the sandy foundations of a Godless creed, that dared not proclaim the immortality of man. In this he was simply the child of the revolution—the mathematician turned prophet! It is the same with his temporal power: society does want reconstruction, but not on the simply republican basis of capital and labour, even though the former should, as a rule, become an hereditary possession for the public good.

The truth is, M. Comte was an Aryan—simply that, and nothing more. Hence his religion is a philosophy, not a faith; and so will remain a beautiful dream, incapable of realisation. He saw and bravely proclaimed the superiority of man's moral over his intellectual nature, but he did not know how to enthrone it, in its rightful supremacy. In short, wherever the Semitic elements of universal progress come into play, he utterly failed either to appreciate or apply them. But he was often great as an Aryan. His eloquent advocacy of the claims of women is an instance in point. A pure Semitism, as in the case of Judaism and the faith of Islam, has always proved deficient in this province. It is the Aryan element in Christianity that has permitted of the worship of the Virgin, although it has not yet been able to restore her sisters to the service of the altar.

In some features of his system M. Comte's racial specialities become even yet narrower, and he ceases to be simply the representative intellectual Aryan proper, having sunk into the Celtic Gaul of monarcho-imperial sympathies, and, of course, with ultra revolutionary antipathies. He has not the faintest conception of true individuality—in others. To him there is but one individual in existence—and that is Auguste Comte, with, of course, his angelic counterpart, the divine Clotilde! He is to be the model man, and she the model woman, to the end of time. Poor fellow, with all his towering ambition, he was only a Frenchman, one of those thirty millions of human machines whom a Bourbon or a Buonaparte, when of competent force, can lead whithersoever he will—the clan blindly following their chief to glory or the grave. Of course, as a logical sequence to this radical defect in his mental constitution, he had no true idea of liberty—not even that of the intellect. He had no faith in the spontaneity of human endeavour. He did not understand it. He wanted everything to be subordinated to system—his system. It is doubtful if he even remotely comprehended genius, or its functions. He at all events made no provision for the free exercise of its powers. It would have proved a terribly disturbing element in his model world of artificial French propriety. There is no necessity for dwelling on his limited positivist library. Such follies refute themselves. No truly

wise man has any fear but that, in the matter of literature, the ages will winnow the chaff from the wheat. So with his limitations and directions as to philosophic speculation or scientific research, his attempted interference was simply the official impertinence of an old French prefect, grown grey in the work of needless superintendence. But we have done. For M. Comte, as an individual, we entertain the greatest respect. Of his system of religion, we will only say that it was the dream of a closet philosopher, who had but a limited personal experience, even of his own people, and no profound or extensive knowledge of the capacities and requirements of alien and diversely constituted races. His systematisation of the sciences will doubtless ever remain as an enduring monument of intellectual power; but the sooner his foolish creed is forgotten the better, not only for his own reputation, but we may add, that of his disciples.

Let not the general tenor of these remarks be misunderstood. There is no doubt that the Semites are pre-eminently the moral division of the Caucasian race, while conversely, the Aryans are the intellectual. But it does not at all follow on this account that the latter are never to take a leading part in the religious development of mankind. This altogether depends upon the work to be done. The Semites, as Jews and Moslemin, have for the time accomplished their portion of the common labour in the propagation and maintenance of monotheism. And what the world now wants is the union with this of the intellectual culture of the Aryans. Existent Christianity is a result of the beginning of the process. In its doctrine, we see the influence of Greek neo-Platonic philosophy; in its ritual, the impress of Roman ceremonial art. But the process of interfusion is by no means complete. Literature and science are still unrepresented in our theology. The religious life of humanity is obviously on the verge of another great period of growth. And the true impulse to this can only come from nations still vital, that is, from the people of Western Europe, the true representatives of Aryan intellect in its more modern phase of development. Asia and its people are dead—awaiting their resurrection, of which, however, Europe must sound the trump. Thus, then, we are not opposed to M. Comte's claims, simply because he was an Aryan, and nothing else, but because, with an unwisdom which was astounding in such a thinker, he wished to ignore our religious progress in the past, and to build the temple of the future, without acknowledging our indebtedness to Semitic tuition during the existing Christian era. We are opposed to him because he wished to substitute a philosophy for a religion, and thus, instead of marching onwards into coming time with ever-accumulating wealth, he would have dropped some of our choicest jewels on the road. But we need have

no fear. What he attempted another will accomplish. Where he failed a greater will triumph. And perhaps in that far future, when the records of these transactions are scanned with the impartial eye of a distant posterity, it will be seen that the life-labour of this earnest and devoted, though mistaken Frenchman, was not altogether in vain, even as a preparation for that other and greater who is to follow in his path, and to succeed where he failed, and to triumph where he was defeated.

At some other time we purpose following out these inquiries on "Race in Religion" by a paper on the existent faiths of the world, and their relationship to the races that hold them. We shall then endeavour to show that Brahmanism and Buddhism are purely Aryan creeds; Judaism and Islamism, Semitic creeds; while Christianity is a result of the fusion of Semitic and Aryan elements in an early, not certainly the final stage of their combination. By an experience thus obtained from the study of history, and the observation of existing facts, we may perhaps be enabled to throw some little light on the probabilities of the future, not however, we trust, in the spirit of dogmatism, but of pure speculation, desirous only of the truth.

ON THE APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF NATURAL SELECTION TO ANTHROPOLOGY,

IN REPLY TO VIEWS ADVOCATED BY SOME OF MR. DARWIN'S DISCIPLES.*

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THE object of the present communication will be to show that the recent application of Mr. Darwin's hypothesis of "Natural Selection" to anthropology by some of Mr. Darwin's disciples, is wholly unwarranted either by logic or by facts.

I have before called the attention† of anthropologists to the remarkable fact that some Darwinites are Monogenists, and, what is still more remarkable, that some Darwinites in this country are even now teaching as a scientific induction, that there is, at the

* This communication was read before the Anthropological Department of the British Association for the Advancement of Science at Nottingham, on August 24th, 1866.

† Carl Vogt's *Lectures on Man*, 1864.